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ABSTRACT
Operation Desert Shield highlighted tremendous problems
with our nation's ability to efficiently move our army and
equipment to distant theaters. The wingship, a hybrid
air/surface craft is a potential solution to our long-standing
sealift deficit. The Sealift Parametric Analysis Model, a
simulation provided by the Naval Surface Warfare Center, was
modified to adapt wingships so that the vessel's impact on
force closure could be analyzed. For a notional force
requiring 19 million square feet of combat gear and support
equipment, wingships augmenting conventional sealift assets
can move the needed equipment into the South Korea or Persian
Gulf theaters much faster than is currently possible. Even
with the large amount of additional square footage of cargo-
carrying capability already programmed for further sealift
assets, troops can be deployed and supported much more quickly
with wingships. Given the diverse global threat in this
rapidly changing world, wingships provide a strategic
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Operation Desert Shield highlighted significant problems
with our nation's ability to efficiently transport our army
and equipment to distant theaters. The wingship, a means of
high-speed ocean transport, exploits the phenomenon of ground-
effect to efficiently move large loads at 400 knots. The
hybrid air/sea craft operate in the displacement, or sea-
sitting, mode to maneuver into or out of port. The majority
of the time, the vessel flies close to the surface of the
water in ground-effect.
The Russians have built and operated wingships since the
1970' s. Ten protoypes, each one larger than its predecessor,
were built and successfully flown. Now, in a joint venture
with the United States, the Russians are helping design a much
larger wingship. The proposed wingship, designed by Aerocon
of Arlington, Virginia, can transport a 1500-ton payload ten
thousand nautical miles. Possible payload options include 20
main battle tanks, 60 standard containers, or 30 attack
helicopters
.
The Sealift Parametric Analysis Model (SPAM) , a
simulation model provided by the Naval Surface Warfare Center,
was modified to incorporate this new asset. Because of
peculiarities with wingship operations and the great speed of
the vessel, delay times in the event-stepped simulation were
vi
changed to reflect the expected operational delays for this
hybrid craft
.
Wingship inventories of 10, 20, 30 and 40 vessels were
analyzed. The square footage of cargo delivered by the
wingships was combined with the output for conventional
sealift forces to determine how much more quickly combat and
support gear could be moved into theater. A notional
deployment force including five army divisions and three
marine expeditionary brigades was used to determine a target
lift requirement. Deployment to the Persian Gulf and South
Korea, two of the most trying scenarios currently envisioned
by the Pentagon, were the basis for the analysis.
Wingships can drastically improve the rate of force
closure. For the South Korea and Persian Gulf scenarios, a
fleet of forty wingships augmenting current lift assets
significantly increases the rate of force build-up. In both
theaters, the notional force is fully armed and ready to fight
in approximately four weeks. This deadline is considerably
sooner than is possible with current lift assets. Force
closure for conflict in the Persian Gulf is realized 70 days
earlier with wingships. The sealift force augmented with 40
wingships delivers cargo to South Korea 74 days sooner than is
currently possible.
Sensitivity analysis was performed on the lift
requirement, berth space at the port of debarcation, vessel
activation times, and wingship stow factor to determine the
vii
force closure under various conditions. In all cases studied,
the benefit of having wingships was significant.
Wingships deliver gear earlier and at a higher rate than
is possible with conventional lift assets. The value of this
quick movement of equipment into theater cannot be overstated.
Wingships give theater Commanders in Chief greater flexibility
and defensive options until substantial amounts of equipment
arrive in theater. Given the diverse global threat in this
rapidly changing world, wingships provide a strategic
deterrent of tremendous value to our nation and to our allies.
Vlll
I . INTRODUCTION
The current military strategy of the United States
requires the capability to rapidly deploy sizeable forces to
all corners of the world. The wingship, a means of high-speed
ocean transport, is a hybrid air/sea craft capable of very
heavy lift over extremely long ranges. The vessel combines
the best features of both sealift and airlift; loads much
larger than those carried on board existing cargo aircraft may
be moved at a speed of 400 knots. The wingship will
complement current strategic lift assets and can be used to
bridge the strategic lift gap between the commencement of
hostilities and the arrival of gear on Maritime Prepositioning
Ships (MPS) and Fast Sealift Support Ships (FSS) . The vehicle
is also ideally suited for delivery of time critical parts and
equipment even after supply channels are well established.
A. WINGSHIP BACKGROTJND
Wingships are neither hydrofoils nor Surface Effect Ships
(SES)
.
By employing a different lift mechanism, wingships are
able to achieve speeds much higher than those attainable with
hydrofoil or SES technology. Wingships rapidly move heavy
equipment tremendous distances by exploiting the phenomenon of
wing- in-ground effect. Flying just above the surface of the
water on the cushion of dense air between the water and the
vehicle, wingships travel at speeds comparable to transport
aircraft but have the cargo-carrying capability of a small
ship [Ref . 1 :p. 82]
.
The Russians have built and successfully operated wingship
vehicles since the 1970' s. Ten experimental craft were
constructed by the Russians, and each wingship was slightly
larger in size and mass than its predecessor. The "Caspian
Sea Monster" had a gross weight of 550 tons and flew at nearly
300 knots. [Ref. 2:p. 3] Since the demise of the former Soviet
Union, the Russians lack the funding to support continued
research in this field. Russian experts are now working
jointly with the United States to develop a large-scale
wingship vehicle
.
Congress recently appropriated five million dollars to
conduct a feasibility study on the employment of wingship
vehicles. Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) assembled
a team of thirteen systems and technology experts from various
fields to provide an assessment to the Department of Defense
(DoD) . The results of the preliminary study will determine if
further funding will be provided to research this mode of
high-speed ocean transport.
The wingship currently under analysis by ARPA is much
larger than any of the Russian prototypes. The proposed
vehicle has the capability to transport personnel and cargo
weighing a total of 1500 tons. Payload options include 20
main battle tanks, 32 attack helicopters, 60 standard
containers, or 2000 troops and a 1200 ton mix of equipment and
supplies. [Ref . 3] With an unrefueled range of 10,000 nautical
miles at a cruising speed of 400 knots, the wingship can
drastically improve force closure. "The wingship will be able
to transport ten times the payload of a C-5 or C-17 over twice
the distance yet at their same speed." [Ref. 3]
The sweeping political changes throughout the world have
reshaped global strategy. "Where deterrence had previously
been expressed in megatons of deliverable nuclear explosive
power, future deterrence will be expressed in millions of tons
of deliverable conventional forces." [Ref. 4:p. 16] The
wingship is the ideal platform to deter aggressors from
hostile action against our nation or its allies.
B. OBJECTIVE
With a more geographically diverse military threat to the
U.S. and with decreasing forward-deployed assets, the wingship
provides necessary flexibility for the deployment of troops
and equipment. Additionally, this craft is well suited for
various other missions outlined in the National Military
Strategy including disaster relief and evacuations of
personnel. The goal of this thesis is to determine the




A modified version of The Sealift Parametric Analysis
Model (SPAM) provided by the Naval Surface Weapons Center
(NSWC) is used to assess the impact of wingships on strategic
lift. Input files for the simulation include conventional
sealift assets and wingships. The model inputs vary so the
effect on force closure of various combinations of sealift
assets can be studied. Conflict in Korea or Southwest Asia,
the most trying scenarios currently envisioned by the
Pentagon, are the basis for the model runs.
II. STRATEGIC LIFT IN OPERATION DESERT SHIELD
A . BACKGROUND
Conflict in Southwest Asia had long been considered the
most difficult scenario for the United States to fight.
Engaging a large, well-equipped force over 8000 miles from
home necessitated a massive logistics effort that severely
tasked the nation's airlift and sealift forces. When Saddam
Hussein moved into Kuwait, the President responded by ordering
the largest U.S. deployment since the Vietnam War. Tremendous
amounts of cargo and equipment were rapidly moved into the
theater; the delivery rate of goods to the Persian Gulf was 33
percent higher than that during the first year of the Korean
War [Ref . 5 :p. 1]
.
The victory over Saddam Hussein in Operation Desert Shield
was indeed impressive, but a careful look at strategic
mobility revealed considerable shortcomings. Had Saddam
Hussein not allowed the allies five months to establish
logistics channels and build up supplies, the course of the
Persian Gulf War may have been quite different.
Shortfalls with strategic sealift were by no means a
surprise. In fact, the capability to transport troops and
equipment to distant theaters has been considered inadequate
since the early 1960 's when President Kennedy and his
Secretary of Defense recognized the need for rapid
improvements [Ref . 6:p. 345] . Enhancements to strategic lift
have been made, but efforts to rectify the lack of adequate
lift have been half-hearted at best. Programs to improve
strategic lift are often costly and traditionally receive less
funding than other high visible national defense programs.
In the decade prior to the Persian Gulf War, four major
studies were conducted by DoD to determine sealift
requirements. All four of the studies concluded that
insufficient strategic lift was available to meet the demands
of the most probable deployment scenarios. [Ref. 7:p. 3]
In testimony before the House Merchant Marine Subcommittee
in March 1990, Admiral Frank Donovan, Commander, Military
Sealift Command (MSC) , estimated that augmented MSC peacetime
assets could move approximately 80 percent of the surge goal
for unit equipment [Ref. 8:p. 45] . Even this estimate about
sealift capability was overly optimistic.
B. STRATEGIC SEALIFT FORCE ASSETS
The major components of the strategic sealift force are
the Afloat Prepositioning Force (APF) , Fast Sealift Support
Ships (FSS) , the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) , and U.S. -flag and
foreign- flag dry cargo ships and tankers.
The APF is further divided into Maritime Prepositioning
Ships (MPS) and Prepositioning ships (PREPO ships) . The
thirteen MPSs, each loaded and fully manned, are divided into
three squadrons. Each squadron, under the command of a U.S.
Navy captain, carries the supplies and equipment to sustain a
Marine Expeditionary Brigade for 3 days of combat [Ref . 9:p.
13] . The squadrons, based on Diego Garcia, Guam and on the
east coast of the United States, are active units. The
vessels operate regularly and should be able to sail
immediately if a crisis erupts. After offloading their
initial cargo, these vessels revert to common-user status.
The nominal speed of an MPS is fifteen knots. [Ref. 5:p. 10]
The twelve PREPO ships, eight dry cargo ships and four
tankers, are loaded with Army, Air Force and Navy equipment.
One of these vessels is prepositioned in the Mediterranean;
the remainder operate out of Diego Garcia. PREPO ships are
always fully manned and should be ready to sail immediately if
directed. These vessels cruise between 16 and 20 knots.
[Ref. 5:p. 11]
The FSSs are a fleet of eight container ships converted by
the Navy to a Roll -On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) configuration. These
ships are berthed at CONUS ports and are maintained in a
Reduced Operating Status (ROS) with skeleton crews aboard.
FSSs should be ready to sail within four days of notification.
With nominal cruising speeds of 30 knots, these vessels are by
far the fastest means to currently move military equipment and
supplies by sea. The combined lift of the FSSs is adequate to
move the entire unit equipment of an Army division. [Ref. 5:p.
11]
The RRF, established in 1976 to provide a rapidly
deployable force capable of meeting surge sealift needs, is a
fleet of former commercial ships purchased because of their
military utility. At the start of the Persian Gulf War, the
RRF fleet comprised 96 vessels, including 17 RO/ROs, 51
breakbulk carriers, 11 tankers and two troopships. RO/ROs are
currently maintained in a ROS condition; the remaining assets
are kept in an inactive 5-day, 10-day or 20-day readiness
condition. If needed, the inactive RRF assets must be towed
to a shipyard for manning and activation. The cruising speed
of each of these vessels varies due to vintage and plant
configuration
.
MSC charters U.S. and foreign- flagged ships to meet
sealift shortfalls. These ships can quickly augment sealift
assets since they are already fully manned and underway.
RO/RO ships, short in the U.S. inventory, are prime candidates
for foreign charter.
C. SEALIFT PERFORMANCE DURING DESERT SHIELD
Desert Shield, supported by the largest and most
concentrated military sealift operation since World War II,
highlighted significant problems with the responsiveness of
surge sealift assets. Huge amounts of supplies and equipment
were moved to the Persian Gulf, but rapid outfitting of combat
troops already in theater was delayed because of the inability
of vessels to be readied within programmed guidelines. The
APF and the FSSs responded much as expected and fairly well
validated these costly programs. The performance of the RRF,
on the other hand, was woefully unsatisfactory.
When Desert Shield commenced, the MPS based on Diego
Garcia and Guam were ordered to sail immediately. Ships based
on Diego Garcia arrived in Saudi Arabia as early as C+8; those
stationed at Guam began arriving to offload gear on C+18. The
remaining MPS assets were activated in Phase II of the buildup
and arrived in theater 28 days after notification to sail.
[Ref. 5:p. 27]
The delivery of equipment on MPS assets was timely, but
the loadout contained insufficient quantities of many
important items and many items not needed at all. According
to a Government Accounting Office report, of the 18,000 line
items aboard one squadron, just 800 matched needs in the Gulf
War. Conversely, multiple requisitions were received for over
3,000 line items not currently included in the MPF inventory.
One Marine division supply officer claimed that over 90
percent of all requisitions processed in theater were for 10
percent of items stocked aboard MPF ships. [Ref. 10:pp. 25-26]
PREPO assets were also dependable surge sealift assets.
The eight dry cargo ships were activated on C+2 and arrived
for offloading between C+10 and C+14 . Five of these ships
made subsequent deliveries after reverting to common-user
status. [Ref. 5:p. 27]
The workhorses of the surge effort were the eight FSSs
.
All eight FSSs were ordered to be activated on C-day or C+1.
The first ship to be activated loaded with 24,000 tons of
equipment, sailed for the Persian Gulf on C+6, and arrived for
offload on C+20. By C+31, seven of the eight ships arrived in
Saudi Arabia. One vessel sustained a series of boiler
casualties and had to be towed to Rota, Spain. Another ESS
picked up the cargo in Rota after delivering her own load and
delivered it to Saudi Arabia on C+47. The breakdown of the
FSS delayed the first wave of deliveries by 16 days. [Ref
.
5:p. 28]
Given the maximum speed of the FSSs and the planned
assembly, loading and offloading times, cargo aboard these
craft should have been delivered to the Persian Gulf by C+21.
Delays through the Suez Canal, draft and trim problems
associated with improper loading, engineering casualties, and
weather all reduced the cruising speed of the FSSs. The first
wave of FSSs averaged just over 23 knots -- well below maximum
speed. [Ref. 7:p. 8] Even at this speed, the FSSs made a
tremendous impact on the buildup effort. During Operation
Desert Shield, the FSSs made a total of 31 deliveries to the
Gulf, an average of over four deliveries per operating ship
[Ref. 5:p. 28] .
As mentioned above, the performance of the RRE was
abysmal. The readiness conditions of the ships did not
reflect the importance of the vessels or the material
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condition of the craft. Of the 44 vessels slated for
activation during Phase I of the operation, only 27 percent
were activated on time. Close to one-half of the ships were
activated more than five days late [Ref . 11 :p. 6-4] . Even the
17 RO/RO vessels, so vital for the rapid movement of military
vehicles, were slow to steam. Just three of these specialized
ships were activated within five days. The activation record
of the RRF vessels used for surge support is shown in Table I.
Figure 1, a scatter plot of activation times for the RRF-5
vessels, further emphasizes the slow response of this vital
sealift asset. Activation times for vessels activated during
the surge phase of the war range from four to 131 days with an
average of 17.11 days. With the three longest activation
TABLE I
RRF ACTIVATIONS FOR SURGE SUPPORT
5 DAY 10 DAY 2 DAY TOTAL
EARLY OR ON TIME 8 3 1 12
0-5 DAYS LATE 10 2 12
6-20 DAYS LATE 15 1 16
> 20 DAYS LATE 4 4
TOTAL 37 6 1 44
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Figure 1. RRF-5 Activation Times
times removed from the data, the mean time drops to 10.94
days--still twice as long as planned.
During Phase II of the buildup, the responsiveness of the
RRF was much the same. Just 22 percent of the vessels
activated during the follow-on stage of the buildup were
loaded on time [Ref . 11 :p. 6-4] . In almost every case, the
activation delays were the result of the poor material
condition of the propulsion or auxiliary machinery. Manning
the vessels with qualified merchant mariners also delayed
activations
.
The performance of the RRF was indeed distressing. In an
interview with Inside the Navy, Vice Admiral Paul Butcher,
then Deputy Commander of Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)
,
remarked
If people go around saying we did great during
Operation Desert Shield, I say the people did great
with the assets we had, but don't let that mask the
problem. . .The Ready Reserve Force is predicated on
the principle that we would break out the ships all at
12
one time. . .If we had to break out all of the ships
simultaneously, we would not have been successful.
[Ref. 12:p. 4]
The U.S. and foreign commercial fleets were immediately
called upon to augment sealift assets. One hundred and
ninety-one ships were chartered to carry unit equipment. Of
the total, only 29 were U.S. controlled. The U.S. controlled
ships delivered less than 30 percent of the total amount of
unit equipment delivered. There were four basic reasons for
using charters so extensively: l)the inventory of RO/ROs in
the RRF was inadequate; 2) the response time of the RRF assets
was unsatisfactory; 3 ) manning the RRF vessels was becoming
increasingly difficult; and 4) the per diem cost to operate the
charters was cheaper than activating and operating the old RRF
ships. [Ref. 5:pp. 30-31]
D. ENHANCEMENTS TO STRATEGIC LIFT
The recently completed Mobility Requirements Study (MRS)
acknowledged the sealift deficit and proposed a program for
the acquisition of additional sealift vessels. Each of the
nine vessels added to the PREPO fleet are RO/ROs with a
300,000 square foot capacity. The new FSSs are Large Medium
Speed RO/ROs (LMSRs) with a capacity of 380,000 square feet
and a cruising speed of 24 knots. The notional delivery





FY 94 FY 9 6 FY 9 7 FY 9 8 TOTAL
PREPO 4 4 1 9
FSS 2 5 4 11
CONTAINER 2 2
The RRF has also been upgraded. Twelve additional RO/ROs
have been added to the fleet since Operation Desert Storm and
seven more are scheduled for delivery. Maintenance and
operation practices have also been revised to improve the
responsiveness of this aging but vital surge sealift asset.
E . SUMMARY
In analyzing the Southwest Asia scenario, defense planners
allowed three weeks for the arrival of the initial heavy
combat forces and eight weeks for five fully equipped
divisions. One month into Desert Shield, only the Marines and
one light army division were in position. [Ref. 7:p. 1]
Desert Shield confirmed that the U.S. force structure,
designed for a European war versus the Soviet Union, lacked
the mobility necessary to promptly respond to diverse regional
threats. We still do not have the capability to deliver a
heavy division and much of its combat support equipment within
three weeks. If private U.S. flag ships are not promptly
requisitioned, and if sealift assets are as sluggish to
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activate as during Operation Desert Shield, delivery of major
combat and support forces will arrive between two and five
weeks late. [Ref. 7:p. 5]
Our nation had difficulties moving equipment in a combat-
free environment, even with outstanding host nation support
and tremendous access to foreign commercial vessels. Initial
movements of personnel and material to the battlefield are of
the utmost importance. It is clear that the time has come for
the United States to aggressively enhance its ability to




As a general rule, the aerodynamic efficiency of
conventional airplanes increases as the wing span for the
required wing area increases. The length of the wings is
primarily restricted by the stresses exhibited at the juncture
with the fuselage [Ref . 14 :p. 3-1] . Without branching into
new realms of technology, the advances in lift capability for
cargo transports will be limited. The C-17 Starlifter, the
transport aircraft currently being built by McDonnell Douglas,
has been plagued with setbacks including the resolution of
stresses related to the length of the wings [Ref. 15] . The
wingship provides a tremendous increase in lift over current
cargo aircraft despite its short and stubby wings. By
exploiting ground-effect, these aerodynamic ships achieve lift
that is not possible in platforms where lift arises from wing
length. Table III shows the cargo carrying capacity of
current air assets and the wingship [Ref. 3] .
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TABLE III







C-5 121 450 5900
C-17 86 450 6300
WINGSHIP 1500 400 10000
The Wright brothers were perhaps the first to observe
aerodynamic ground-effect. They noticed that their gliders
covered the greatest distances when only a foot or so off the
sand dunes of Kitty Hawk [Ref. 2:p. 4] . Because of the
ground-effect phenomenon, it is technologically feasible to
"build an aircraft three times larger and ten times heavier
than the largest airplane currently manufactured or
envisioned." [Ref. 14 :p. 1-1]
B. CHARACTERISTICS
The vessel under analysis by ARPA is shown in Figure 2.
Dimensions and characteristics of the 5000-ton wingship are






Maximum Gross Take-off 5150
Maximum Aft Cargo 1200






Fuselage Depth (max) 62
Wingspan 340
INTERNAL DIMENSIONS (feet)
Aft CarQO Bay Deck Areas (approximate)
Length 225 A--Deck 19, 000
Height 23 B--Deck 27, 000






The four primary modes of wingship operations are depicted
in Figure 3 [Ref . 3] . When waterborne in the sea-sitting
mode, the craft operates much like a traditional ship. The
ship maneuvers with two after-mounted screws and one forward-
mounted unit. Three different modes of displacement
propulsion are under investigation. All modes involve
retractable propulsion gear that is driven by reliable diesel
engines. Speeds may be limited to ten knots and
maneuverability much as it would be for conventional
waterborne vessels of comparable size. The small draft of the
wingship, less than ten feet when fully loaded, gives the
craft an advantage over deep-draft vessels that may be unable
to enter shallow ports. [Ref. 16]
Displacement PAR
Ground^ffect Free-Flight
Figure 3. Wingship Modes of Operation
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Wingships operate in the Power Augmented Ram (PAR) mode
during takeoff and landing. Because of the greater induced
drag while moving into and out of the water, additional thrust
is required. On takeoff, for example, jets positioned on the
forward part of the aircraft vector thrust under the leading
edge of the wing until the aircraft is clear of the water and
can utilize ground-effect. Speeds may be limited to 150 knots
while strictly in the PAR mode of operation.
The most efficient mode of operation is the surface or
ground-effect mode. The wingship flies between 20 and 90 feet
above the surface of the water. The smaller the craft, the
lower the vehicle must fly to optimize ground-effect. In
ground-effect operations, the aft-mounted cruise engines are
operating, and the forward-mounted engines are shut down or
operating at reduced power. Speeds up to 400 knots are
possible
.
Conventional aircraft flight or "free air operation" is
used when operating out of ground-effect at a high angle of
attack. Wingships will transit to "free air operation" to fly
over small land masses or canals, or to avoid shipping and
other obstacles in the normal flight path. This mode of
operation requires maximum power and is fairly inefficient.
[Ref
. 17] Even under these less efficient conditions, speeds
of up to 350 knots are possible [Ref. 18]
.
The wingships were originally designed as RO/RO platforms
with the added capability to transport commercial containers,
20
bulk dry goods and troops. Wingships using the same pier
facilities as traditional sealift assets will be able to load
military vehicles at approximately the same rate [Ref . 19] .
The wingship can also accommodate outsize equipment not easily
transportable aboard military aircraft. As with normal
aircraft loading, some cargo types will be weight-limited and
other loads will be area-limited.
Special cranes have been designed to load containers into
the wingship. However, containers routinely drop during
loading operations. The danger of a dropped load and the
certain devastating effect on the airframe make this mode of
operation less likely than previously envisioned. Movement of
dry cargo is much more profitable on ships, so this method of
transport will be used only in rare occasions. [Ref. 19]
After loading, wingships will transit in the displacement
mode until clear of other shipping and obstacles. The ship
will then transition to the PAR mode of operation and then
rapidly into ground effect. Wingships will fly in ground-
effect along the same routes used by other sealift assets.
Upon reaching a strait or other navigational chokepoint,
wingships will transition to the less efficient free-flight
mode. Once clear of dense shipping, the vehicle will return
to ground-effect, its most efficient mode of operation.
21
D. POTENTIAL MILITARY UTILIZATION
Wingships have the capability to discharge their cargo at
developed or undeveloped ports. Delivery of goods to
established port facilities is the primary mode of operation.
Cargo offload of the wingship will occur at approximately the
same rate as offload for similar cargo from traditional ships.
Offload of a fully loaded wingship requires eight to twelve
hours if discharging RO/RO or container loads.
If delivering goods to an undeveloped port, the vehicle
can beach itself and utilize the bow ramp to offload self-
propelled equipment. The vehicle can also operate in the PAR
mode of operation to maneuver to an optimal delivery point
farther up the beach. If the load is not self-propelled, the
entire lower deck of the wingship may be moved onto the beach
in approximately two hours by utilizing jupes. Jupes are
round cavities fed with low pressure air that provide a means
to float the lower deck out of the vehicle [Ref . 20] . The
deck will move on a cushion of air much like a puck in an air
hockey game. Not all beaches are suitable for offload of
equipment. If there is not adequate access to major roadways
or railways from the offload point, the gear may be stuck on
the beach.
Wingships designed for amphibious operations must
withstand additional stresses due to pounding waves and
landings ashore. Because of the structural enhancements
required for these amphibious wingships, the lift capability
22
is necessarily lower. A wingship landing at an undeveloped
site can transport a load approximately two-thirds the size of
a load carried by a wingship designed to offload at
established ports. [Ref. 19]
The wingship has fuel tanks in the wings and the fuselage.
Refuelings of wingships will be conducted in port during cargo
operations or at sea by an oiler. Mid-air refueling is not an
option. In instances where fuel supplies are not readily
available, such as initial landings at undeveloped ports, mid-
mission refuelings will be conducted. A vehicle flying to the
Persian Gulf, for instance, will top off in Italy on the
inbound and outbound legs of the journey. This minimizes the
time the asset is in theater prior to substantial combat
forces being assembled.
A wingship fleet may be employed in the following manner:
approximately ten will be used on a day-to-day basis by the
military. Of those ten, one or two on each coast will be
marked for a one-day turnaround dedicated to a military
mission. Ten more wingships will be under TRANSCOM control
and available for loading within two days. The remaining
wingships will be in commercial use. If needed for a military
mission, they will be called up much like airliners under the
Civilian Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and will be available for
loading within five days. [Ref. 19]
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IV. MODEL DESCRIPTION
A. SEAL IFT PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS MODEL
As stated in Chapter I, SPAM was utilized to determine the
impact of wingships on strategic lift. Built as a result of
congressional action in fiscal year 1990 legislation, SPAM was
designed to "compare the relative value of technology
combinations" in traditional sealift ships [Ref . 21 :p. 3] .
SPAM is an event stepped Monte Carlo simulation written in the
SIMSCRIPT II. 5 language. The model computes the amount of
cargo delivered over a selected time period for a chosen
combination of sealift ships, routes, and ports. The model
generates graphs of cargo delivery versus time, an event-by-
event chronology, and summary statistics. The summary
statistics contain 95 percent confidence intervals for the
mean tonnage and mean square footage delivered, and the
average and maximum number of ships waiting to be loaded or
unloaded at each port of embarkation or debarkation,
respectively
.
Because of the complexity of deriving an analytical model
to completely describe our nation's sealift, simulation is a
practical means to obtain useful data about various asset
mixes. In particular, a Monte Carlo simulation is defined as
"... a scheme employing random numbers, that is, uniform(0,l)
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random variates, for solving certain stochastic or
deterministic problems.... " [Ref . 22:p. 113]
SIMSCRIPT II. 5 is a specially designed simulation
language. Simulation models built in SIMSCRIPT II. 5 are
significantly smaller than those built using a general purpose
language like FORTRAN, Pascal, or C. Fifteen thousand lines
of FORTRAN code would be needed to create a model equivalent
to the four-thousand line SPAM written in SIMSCRIPT II. 5 [Ref.
21 :p. 5] . Execution times are also shortened by using a
simulation-specific language.
SPAM output was corroborated during Desert Shield. There
was good correlation between the actual delivery rates for
sealift vessels during the buildup for the Persian Gulf War
and the SPAM-generated output. [Ref. 23]
The following information is required for each of the
sealift assets in the user-generated input data set: ship
type (RO/RO, container, bul]<:, or tan]<:er) , initial location,
readiness state, cruising speed, unrefueled range, capacity,
stow factor, load and unload times, number of shafts, mean
time between propulsion or mission-aborting failures, mean
time to repair, and probability of loss due to air, submarine,
or mine threat
.
Necessary port information in the input data set includes
the following: number of berths, probability of being
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attacked, probability of attack survival, capability to load
and unload ships, location of repair and refueling facilities,
and delay times.
Information about routes in the input data set includes
the seaports of embarkation (SPOE) and debarkation (SPOD)
,
distance between ports, threat probabilities along the route,
probability the route is utilized, refueling delays, and
applicable canal transit delays.
The following assumptions are implicit to the model:
• Refueling assets are available when needed during transit.
• Prepositioned assets are at their forward locations and
are immediately sent to their POD.
• Ships unable to utilize a home or foreign port because of
damage proceed to the next closest facility for loading or
unloading
.
• Goods are ready to be loaded or offloaded as soon as ships
moor
.
• Ships require six hours to transit into or out of port.
• There are no restrictions on port entry times or cargo
load and unload times. Tugs, pilot services, and other
support are available for around-the-clock operations at
port facilities.
• Maintenance is conducted while vessels are in transit.
B. IMPACT OF IMPLICIT ASSUMPTIONS ON MODEL OUTPUT
Having prepositioned assets at their forward locations
optimistically predicts MPS performance. During Desert
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Shield, one of the MPS vessels normally forward-based in Diego
Garcia was undergoing overhaul in the United States. This
vessel delivered her cargo three weeks after initial
deliveries by other ships in the squadron [Ref . 5:p. B-11]
.
The model is restricted to modeling the movement of
shipping between ports. Delays on the ground due to late
cargo arrival are not modeled specifically. Random delays are
modeled, but they do not accurately represent the load delays
experienced by sealift vessels in Operation Desert Shield.
This delay is time dependent. During the surge phase of the
build-up for the Gulf War, cargo was available for loading 70
percent of the time when ships were ready for loadout . During
the sustainment phase of the Gulf War, cargo was ready to be
loaded just 34 percent of the time when ships arrived. [Ref.
5:p. 16] . Since the wingships make more deliveries, their
performance is more grossly modeled.
The transit times for vessels account for delays due to
tidal variations, navigational chokepoints, and possible mine
threats. A six-hour transit for vessels outbound from POEs or
inbound to PODs is reasonable for ships but too conservative
for the wingship since it operates in the displacement mode
for only a limited time.
The lack of restrictions on port entry times in the model
has little effect on the output of the model. It is
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reasonable to assume that ports will operate on a twenty-four
hour basis during mobilization.
For sealift vessels, routine maintenance may be performed
during transit or may be deferred until the next scheduled
shipyard availability. It is realistic for conventional ships
to complete multiple deliveries without a break in operations.
Maintenance for the wingship, as for cargo aircraft, must be
completed more regularly. Traditional cargo aircraft have a
down-time immediately following operations. For the 100 days
of the analysis, traditional sealift vessels make a maximum of
four round- trips. Wingships, on the other hand, may complete
ten round trips during the surge phase of the operation. The
wingship has 20 engines operating in a harsh seawater
environment; a maintenance down-time must be simulated for the
wingship if the results are to be realistic. Otherwise, the
performance of the wingship is overstated.
Wingships may occupy more than one berth due to wings
extending out over the pier. Wingship performance may be over
estimated if a limited number of berths are equipped to
offload wingships.
Individual ships traveled between multiple ports during
Operation Desert Shield, but this cannot be modeled by SPAM.
This restriction has little effect on the model output.
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C. MODIFICATIONS TO SPAM
The original model was written to allow ships to be placed
into one of four readiness states: ready, 10-day, 60-day, or
build-and-charter . Since surge capability was specifically
analyzed, several modules of the model were modified to delete
the 60 -day readiness category and include the option of the 4-
day readiness category. The distribution of activation times
for the 4-day vessels is uniform(0,4) days. An activation
event for wingships was added to the model; activation times
for these assets are uniform (1,3) days.
Many of the parameters for the wingship were difficult to
determine. Since no wingships of such large scale have yet
been constructed, much of the input data was design data.
Where possible, data from related operating systems was
researched to determine field-tested values. For instance,
the refueling time for the wingship was determined by dividing
fuel capacity by the normal pumping rate of an oiler. An
additional two hours was added to the event time to allow for
travel off the normal shipping route and hookup time.
Further changes to the original model were made to
properly model wingships. The hybrid craft do not need to
transit the entire inbound and outbound q-routes at either end
of the open ocean transit. Q-routes define safe passage for
ships into or out of port. Modules were changed to schedule
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the open ocean transit one hour following the loading or
unloading of the wingship. The one-hour delay was introduced
to account for the time the wingship operates at lower than
optimal speed in the displacement and PAR modes of operation.
Changes were also made to the event modules for canal
transit. Passage times in SPAM for sealift vessels
transitting the Suez Canal are uniformly distributed between
0.48 and 0.58 days. The transit time for ships through the
Panama Canal is deterministic and equals 8 hours. Since
wingships transition to free flight to fly over small land
masses, canal transit times for the wingships are greatly
reduced. A speed of 350 knots was used to determine the
appropriate modeling time for the wingship to transit the
canals. Wingships commence free-flight operations ten miles
before the canal and continue in the free- flight mode of
operations until ten miles past the chokepoint
.
Modifications were made to modules to schedule an
additional event for the wingships. A three-day maintenance
period following cargo delivery is simulated so that
preventive maintenance on the 20 jet engines can be performed.
The lengthy maintenance period is an extreme worst case. If
actual maintenance time is shorter, the wingship output is
pessimistically modeled.
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Figure 4 is a simple schematic of the modified version of
SPAM showing the event progression for wingships . The only
difference between the event progression for wingships and
conventional sealift assets is the maintenance event at the
SPOE. Major events in the simulation and the associated










Figure 4. Modified SPAM Schematic
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Input files were created for two of the most difficult
scenarios envisioned by defense planners. Conflict in
Southwest Asia and buildup for a conflict in Korea with no aid
from Japan were the test cases. Unsupported engagements in
these arenas demand maximum use of strategic lift assets.
Input data files were created for two situations in each
theater. The asset mixes included 10, 20, 30, or 40 wingships
and current and projected PREPO, MPS, and RRF inventories.
The projected fleet levels are based on full implementation of
the force levels recommended in the recently completed MRS.
The goal of the model was to determine how much more quickly
a notional deployment force could be armed and ready to fight
with wingships in the strategic sealift inventory.
B. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS
1 . Army Requirement
The Army Strategic Mobility Plan (ASMP) is a program
to "deploy a CONUS-based five division contingency corps
anywhere in the world." [Ref . 24 :p. 1] This plan, a major
factor in the recently completed MRS requires the deployment
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of the following units: one airborne division, two heavy-
divisions, one air a.-sault division, two heavy brigades, and
the associated Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support
(CSS) equipment. CS includes engineers, military
intelligence, signal and chemical support. CSS includes
transportation, ammunition, maintenance, quartermaster, and
administration services. Without support, divisions are
limited by fuel and ammunition and can fight for just three
days. The amount of square footage of CS/CSS gear required to
support each division is approximately two times the combat
gear requirement. [Ref. 24 :p. 2]
The unit movement requirements are included in Table
VI [Ref. 25 :p. 25] . The total entered in the sixth column of
Table VI is the total square footage lift requirement for the
unit and its necessary support equipment.
TABLE VI
UNIT MOVEMENT REQUIREMENTS




16, 170 996, 781 32, 546 168, 594 2, 990,343
Airborne 13, 109 858,492 21, 943 100,212 2,575,476
Armored 16, 921 1,427, 996 96, 580 275, 273 4, 283, 988
Infantry 16, 938 1,169, 664 59,508 210, 006 3, 508, 992
Light
Infantry
10,871 445,598 14,436 71, 938 1,336,794
Mechanized 17,235 1,422, 844 95, 010 274, 518 4,268, 532
BRIGADE
Armored 4, 047 321, 786 25, 352 63, 329 965,358
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There are two different philosophies for the movement
of CS/CSS gear. The first approach is to send combat cargo
for the bulk of the divisions first, followed by support gear.
This scheme was the option employed during Desert Shield. A
better approach is to deliver support gear simultaneously with
the combat gear for the division. Delivering combat gear and
CS/CSS gear early provides the maximum strategic conventional
deterrent and gives the divisions a rapid fighting capability.
Deployment of a five-division Army corps (a normal
corps includes three divisions) per the ASMP including the
following elements and associated support gear was analyzed:
one airborne division, one air assault division, two armored
divisions, and two armored brigades. The total lift
requirement for the Army equals 16,064,511 square feet.
2 . Marine Corps Requirement
Three Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) were
simultaneously deployed to the theater of operations. It was
assumed that the initial movements of cargo on the MPS assets
fully supported the three forces. In addition, each Assault
Follow-on Echelon needs 800,000 square feet of gear. The
total Marine Corps requirement for the surge phase of any




3. Total Surge Lift Requirement
The total lift requirement is 21,104,511 square feet.
Over the course of a entire war, sealift vessels historically
carry 95 percent of all goods delivered into theater. Airlift
assets transport proportionally larger amounts of equipment
during the buildup than during the campaign. Assuming that
ten percent of surge equipment will move by air initially, the
sealift requirement for the notional deployment package is 90




Table VII shows the number and type of assets that
comprise the current and projected strategic sealift forces.
Selected inputs for the SPAM data sets are included in Table
VIII .
TABLE VII

























APF BREAKBULK 127 15. 11.0
RRF RO/RO 86-220 15.2-22 .5 0.5








NEW APF RO/RO 300 24.0 2.0
NEW RRF RO/RO 150 18.5 0.5
LMSR 380 24 . 0.5
WINGSHIPS 97 400.0 .4
The following assumptions were made to develop input data
sets
• Wingships perform to design specifications.
• All conventional surge assets and wingships have a stow
factor, the ratio of square footage of cargo loaded to the
square footage of deck space available, of 0.75.
• Wingships load only RO/RO or containerized cargo.
• Sealift asset activation times are as programmed.
• A limited number of U.S. charters will be available for
surge support. These ships arrive at SPOE between ten and
thirty days.
37
• There is no support from the international community for
surge sealift assets.
• There is no threat to strategic lift assets in the
vicinity of the SPOD.
• Only the delivery of dry cargo is considered.
D. IMPACT OF INPUT DATA SET ASSUMPTIONS ON MODEL OUTPUT
Assuming that the wingship performs to design
specifications is indeed optimistic. The Aerocon-proposed
design is still under investigation and will likely be
modified. Since the 5000-ton wingship will be the first
ground-effect vehicle of such large scale, there will
undoubtedly be many alterations to the final production model.
For example, the C-17 recently delivered to the Air Force had
125 waivers and deviations from the original contract
specifications [Ref . 26]
.
For planning purposes, TRANSCOM uses a 0.75 stow factor
for surge sealift assets [Ref. 24 :p. 7] . In many cases, cargo
loadouts for the wingship may be weight limited vice area-
limited. In these instances, the stow factor of 0.75 is
optimistic
.
As discussed earlier, activation times for RRF vessels
were abysmal during Operation Desert Shield. TRANSCOM'
s
number one priority is the improved responsiveness of the
surge fleet. The importance of sealift to our national
defense was echoed when the defense budget was recently
approved. A large amount of money was earmarked for sealift.
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It is assumed that modifications to maintenance procedures
will improve the responsiveness of these vessels. Also, it is
expected that all eight of the FSSs will promptly deliver
their cargo; one of the FSSs broke down during Desert Storm
and made no deliveries to the Persian Gulf. Modeling RRF and
FSS performance per Desert Shield might bias the analysis
toward the wingships
.
Lack of reliance on the international community for
support is a conservative assumption. In some conflicts,
there may be tremendous support, but the United States must be
able to rapidly move its army without assistance. While
foreign- flagged vessels delivered 28 percent of all dry cargo
delivered to the Gulf over the course of the entire war, there
was relatively little contribution from foreign-flagged
vessels during the surge portion of Operation Desert Shield.
No foreign charters arrived in theater by C+42; just 11 ships
arrived by C+60 [Ref . 5]
.
"The validity of the cautious go-it-alone assumption with
regard to foreign participation in U.S. -led military
operations is punctuated by the lack of initial support from
Japan and Germany." [Ref. 7:p. 1] These two nations depend
more than the United States on oil exported from the Mideast,
but provided no assets during the early phase of the buildup.
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E. SPAM OUTPUT
1 . South Korea Scenario
Figure 5 shows the cumulative square footage delivered
to Pusan, South Korea by the current and projected sealift
forces. The future force, enhanced with new RO/ROs, delivers
five million more square feet by day C+60 than current assets.
Ten million more square feet are delivered by day C+100 .
Assets begin to arrive in theater on day C+15 for either asset
mix.



















Individual delivery profiles for fleets of wingships
are compared with our nation's current surge capability in
Figure 6. The terrific cargo delivery potential of wingships
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is apparent. While a small fleet of wingships cannot match
the equivalent square footage delivered by current sealift
forces, the hybrid craft can quickly move tremendous amounts
of cargo into theater. Early arrival of equipment in theater
is terribly important to theater Commanders In Chief (CINCs)
.
Having combat gear and defense systems in place immediately
gives the CINC more defensive options and reduces the risk to
troops already on the ground. The combination of speed and











cargo carrying capacity of the wingship is so great that just
twenty wingships can deliver more cargo to Pusan than the
current combination of strategic sealift assets. Twenty
wingships can deliver over 24 million square feet of supplies
to Pusan in a 100-day period.
Since wingships ideally augment, rather than compete
with, conventional sealift forces, SPAM was run to model the
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combined effect of wingships and sealift vessels. The amount
of cargo delivered by wingships and the present and future
sealift forces is shown in Figures 7 and 8, respectively.






































Given the notional sealift cargo requirement of 18.9
million square feet to support five Army divisions and three
MEBs , Figures 7 and 8 can be used to extract the force closure
date for various combinations of wingships with current and
projected strategic sealift forces. With current lift assets
and no wingships, it takes 106 days to deliver the needed
cargo into theater. Projected strategic sealift assets reduce
the closure time considerably; the goal of 18.9 million square
feet can be met in 69 days.
Figure 9 graphically depicts the change in force
closure date for increasing numbers of wingships. Force
closure improves considerably with employment of the first ten
wingships, and improves at a noticeably decreasing rate as the
inventory of wingships increases. It is noteworthy that the
force closure date with future assets and no wingships, C+69,
is nearly the same as the force closure date for the current
lift assets and ten wingships, C+64 . Similarly, future lift
assets and ten wingships can deliver the same amount of cargo
as current lift assets and 20 wingships by the same deadline,
C+48. The improved lift capability of the future sealift
force is roughly equivalent to the capability of a ten
wingship fleet.
Figure 10 is an alternate presentation of the benefit
realized for various numbers of wingships. Again, it is clear
that the initial ten wingships have the greatest impact on
force closure. When combined with current assets, ten
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wingships reduce force closure by 42 days. Ten wingships
reduce force closure by 21 days if combined with projected
lift assets. Once the inventory of wingships reaches 30






































ships, the marginal benefit of additional wingships is greatly
reduced. With current lift assets, 40 wingships move the
required load into theater one week sooner than a current
fleet augmented with 3 wingships. As the wingship inventory
is increased from 3 to 40 wingships, programmed sealift
forces reach the target delivery goal just four days earlier.
The wingships modeled represent an active wingship
force. If post-flight maintenance requires longer than the
modeled three days, or if several craft are required to keep
one wingship flying at such a high-cycle rate, the significant
change in marginal benefit occurs at a proportionally higher
inventory level
.
The benefit of wingships is clearly dependent upon the
amount of equipment that must be moved into the theater of
operations. Sensitivity analysis was performed using lift
requirements of 10, 15, 20, 25, and 30 million square feet.
Figure 11 and Figure 12 show the reduction in force closure
due to wingships with current and projected sealift forces,
respectively. The benefit of wingships increases with an
increasing lift requirement. If a 30 million square foot
cargo requirement exists and current strategic forces are
used, force closure is reduced by 12 days when the inventory
of wingships increases from 30 to 40 vessels. Figure 11 shows
that, independent of the lift requirement, it takes 3
additional wingships to match the equivalent force reduction
of the initial ten wingships.
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SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS ON LIFT REQUIREMENT;
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From Figure 12 it is clear that wingships drastically
improve force closure if the lift requirement exceeds ten
million square feet. The force closure improvement is less
predictable in this instance. The combination of the effects
of the increased cargo capacity of the future sealift force
and the cyclical nature of the cargo deliveries by the ships
causes the curves to behave differently. The initial ten
wingships reduce force closure more for a 15 million square
foot requirement than the 20 million square foot requirement
because the delivery rate of the wingships is relatively
constant while the deliveries by the conventional surge assets
is variable. The 15 million lift requirement is met with
wingships while the delivery rate by ships is at a lull.
Force closure improvement is relatively independent of medium
range lift requirements with ten or 20 wingships. The step
improvement in force closure when a 30 million square foot
requirement exists is again a function of the long cycle times
of slowly moving surge sealift assets. Wingships travel with
smaller loads, but they can deliver their cargo prior to
sealift assets completing another round trip.
The amount of berth space at the POD can also
potentially affect the rate of cargo delivery. Sensitivity
analysis was performed on the number of berths available in
Pusan to determine if the assumption of 24 berths drastically
affects the ability of traditional ships to efficiently
deliver their cargo. Figure 13 shows the mean square footage
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(in thousands) delivered over a 100-day period with varying
numbers of berths. Figure 14 shows the maximum and average
number of ships waiting to unload their cargo during the same
period.
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with more than 14 berths, less ships enter a queue before
unloading cargo. Clearly, the assumption of 24 berths does
not significantly alter the results of the analysis if between
14 and 3 6 berths are available in Pusan for offload.
SPAM runs were also completed to perform sensitivity
analysis on the wingship stow factor. The simulation was run
for 60 days to assess the effect of a smaller stow factor on
the quantity of cargo delivered. Over a 60-day period, ten
wingships with a stow factor of 0.75 deliver three million
square feet more than wingships with a stow factor of 0.45.
The effect is linear; 40 wingships with a stow factor of 0.75
deliver 12 million more square feet than ships with a stow
factor of 0.45 over the same two-month period.
SENSITVITY ANALYSIS ON WINGSHIP STOW FACTOR










To determine the change in force closure due to a
smaller stow factor, the modified SPAM was again run for
combinations of wingships and sealift assets. The requirement
of 18.9 million square feet was held constant while the lift
capability of the wingships was reduced. Figures 16 and 17
show the changes in force closure for 10, 20, 30, and 40
wingships augmenting current and future sealift force levels,
respectively. Since wingships have a greater impact in a less
robust sealift environment, lowering the wingship stow factor
has a more pronounced effect in the case with current lift
assets. Forty wingships with stow factors of 0.45 still
deliver the required cargo into theater much sooner than pure
sealift assets, but cargo arrives 13 days later than it would
on wingships with stow factors of 0.75. If ten wingships are
flying, gear arrives in theater nine days later on the more
lightly loaded vessels.
In the case with projected lift assets, the largest
change in force closure is evident if there are ten wingships
in the sealift inventory. The ten wingships with a stow
factor of 0.75 help improve force closure by 21 days. If ten
wingships with stow factors of 0.75 augment sealift forces,
force closure occurs just ten days sooner than it would
without the wingships.
The stow factor is a driving factor in the number of
wingships that should be acquired. For instance, from Figure
16, it is apparent that 30 wingships with stow factors of 0.55
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provide the same force closure reduction as 40 wingships with
stow factors of 0.45.
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS ON WINGSHIP STOW
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Because of the delays in activating RRF vessels during
Operation Desert Shield, sensitivity analysis was performed
on the RRF break-out times. The distribution in SPAM for the
activation event was modified to determine the effect on cargo
deliveries by these ships. The original uniform(0,4) day
activation was changed to a uniform( 5 , 15 ) days and then to a
gamma distribution. A normal distribution centered on the
mean activation time could not be used since the data was
skewed to the right. Also, the large amount of variance in
the activation times caused negative numbers to be generated
for the activation event, and the model abruptly stopped
running. Figure 18 shows the delivery profiles for current
RRF assets delivering cargo to South Korea. The difference in
the amount of cargo delivered during a 100-day buildup is
smaller than anticipated. Over the course of the build up,
the maximum difference between the cargo delivered by the two
forces with uniformly distributed break-out times is
approximately two million square feet . It is important to
note that the current RRF fleet consists of 77 vessels.
Personnel and equipment were in short supply when just 44 RRF
ships were activated during Desert Shield. It is unlikely
that adequate support exists to activate all of the RRF assets
on time.
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2 . Persian Gulf Scenario
Analysis was also performed to assess the impact of
wingships on deployment to the Persian Gulf. The same numbers
and type of assets are used to model the capabilities of the
current and projected strategic sealift forces. Wingships and
sealift vessels depart from both coasts of the United States
and deliver cargo to two well-developed ports in Saudi Arabia.
Ad Dammam has 3 berths for offload of material; Al Jubayl has
20.
Figure 19 shows the amount of cargo that can be
delivered to the Persian Gulf using current and projected
assets. With the enhanced surge sealift fleet, it is possible
to deliver 14 million more square feet of cargo to the Persian
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Figure 19 .
can deliver 34 million square feet of cargo into theater over
the 100-day period. This amount of cargo is approximately
five million more square feet than could be delivered to South
Korea over the same time period. The pronounced change in
slope of the curve for projected lift assets is a function of
the turn-around cycle for the new RO/ROs. The curve flattens
out while the majority of the lift assets are completing their
round- trip voyages.
Figures 20 and 21 show the cargo delivery profiles for
wingship-augmented strategic sealift forces. These graphs
differ only slightly from the graphs generated for deployment
to South Korea.
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The force closure curve generated for the 18.9 million
square foot requirement for this scenario is shown in Figure
22. Once again, the force closure date can be reduced
significantly by the first ten wingships . The benefit of
acquiring more than 3 wingships is again small for both the
current and projected lift cases.
Figure 23 shows the reduction in deployment time for
various numbers of wingships. The shape of this curve is the
same as for the deployment to South Korea, but the actual time
savings is slightly different. It requires only ten less days
to deploy the notional force to the Persian Gulf if ten
wingships are employed with projected lift assets. If current
lift assets are used, the build up period is shortened by 40
days .













































As with the South Korea scenario, sensitivity analysis
was performed on the lift requirement. Figures 24 and 25 show
force closure reduction versus wingships for current and
projected lift assets, respectively.
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS ON LIFT REQUIREMENT;
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Sensitivity analysis was performed on the number of
berths available at Ad Dammam. Per the model, only
prepositioned assets and wingships offload cargo in Al Jubayl,
and there is adequate space to berth vessels destined for this
port. Figure 26 shows the mean square footage of cargo
delivered versus the number of berths utilized. The 95
percent upper and lower confidence intervals are also included
on the graph. The amount of cargo that is moved into theater
varies very little if at least 15 piers are available in Ad
Dammam
.
The maximum and average number of ships waiting to be
offloaded is shown in Figure 27. If only ten berths are
available for the duration of the buildup, a maximum of 52
ships will be in the queue, and the average number of ships in
the queue for the 100-day scenario will be 22. The average
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number of ships in the queue does not change appreciably if
there are at least 15 piers and no more than 50.
Figure 26.


















Sensitivity analysis was again performed on the
wingship stow factor to determine the impact on force closure.
Figures 28 and 29 show how a changing stow factor affects the
force closure improvement for the Persian Gulf scenario. the
magnitude of change in force closure is smaller than in the
South Korea scenario. The current strategic sealift force
augmented with 40 wingships with stow factors of 0.45 deliver
cargo just six days later than a same size fleet of wingships
having stow factors of 0.75. Even wingships with stow factors
with 0.45 drastically reduce the rate of force closure in both
the South Korea and Persian Gulf scenarios.
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS ON WINGSHIP STOW
















eJ S 20 -O M -10 WINGSHIPS
^ 10-
n




SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS ON WINGSHIP STOW
















"^ n H 1—1 D
ot;
-




















The outputs of the original and modified SPAMs demonstrate
that wingships can, without a doubt, drastically affect the
rate at which fully-equipped forces can be delivered to
distant theaters. If 40 wingships are used, a notional force
requiring 18.9 million square feet of equipment can be
deployed to the Persian Gulf or South Korea in approximately
four weeks, two months sooner than is currently possible with
sealift alone . Even if all programmed lift assets are
acquired, a fleet of 40 wingships will still have a tremendous
impact on force closure. Force closure for conflict in the
Persian Gulf can be reached 34 days sooner if wingships are
employed. Wingships reduce force closure to South Korea by 42
days if augmenting the projected sealift force.
The modified SPAM schedules round-trips for wingships
flying between modern port facilities to Korea and the Persian
Gulf in two to three days. The short turnaround time agrees
with the expected performance advertised by Aerocon.
A . RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Enhancements to SPAM
SPAM is an excellent model for comparing the
capabilities of different sealift forces. However, to permit
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a more in-depth analysis of different asset mixes, the
following two recommendations are made:
a - Modify SPAM to permit the scheduling of voyages
between multiple ports. Arrays of information for SPOE and
SPOD for each of the vessels, or further entries in the input
data set for subsequent deliveries, would better model actual
ship operations. Entries for ports of subsequent deliveries
would enable, for instance, a prepositioned ship that has just
dropped off her cargo to proceed to Germany to pick up and
deliver army equipment to the Persian Gulf prior to heading
back to the United States. Few of the ships used in Desert
Shield and Desert Storm operated between just two ports. The
wingship, in particular, is a prime example of a type of
vessel that could potentially travel between multiple ports.
b - Modify SPAM to allow for specific types and
numbers of loading/unloading facilities at each of the ports.
Because of the differences of cargo handling equipment and, in
the case of RO/ROs the need for loading ramps, not all ships
can offload at the same berths. In the present miodel, a
separate port, say Pusan-RO/RO, needs to be included in the
foreign port data set if a limited number of RO/RO berths are
to be simulated. Otherwise, the RO/RO ship unloads at the
first available berth. Because of related entries, the
addition of another foreign port is much more cumbersome than
the inclusion of more specific information about berth
capacities at each of the ports.
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2 . Areas for Further Research
A cost-benefit analysis should be performed to
determine the correct allocation of sealift funds. Much of
the money currently earmarked for sealift may be better spent
on this new mode of high-speed ocean transit. Commercial
involvement in the wingship program, with a program similar to
CRAF, will offset many of the development and operation costs,
and must be considered.
B . SUMMARY
The value of the early arrival of equipment in wingships
is difficult to quantify, but of extreme importance.
Especially in instances where there is very little warning
time, wingships provide a huge conventional deterrent to
potential adversaries. Future countries contemplating attacks
on our nation or our allies know that they cannot err like
Sadaam Hussein. They know that they must attack swiftly
before sufficient forces can mobilize to counter the threat.
Wingships will undoubtedly give theater CINCs increased
flexibility and fighting potential. Aggressors faced with a
rapidly-growing U.S. force may be forced to delay or alter
their plan of attack.
The current timeline for force deployment is lengthy;
deployment of a sizeable force in two months is the goal.
Desert Shield demonstrated that even this long time frame is
optimistic for our current strategic sealift fleet. With
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wingships, a new standard for force closure is possible.
Wingships are indeed a huge part of the solution of our
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